On August 7, 2006, 14..57, an explosion occurred in the nitrification workshop of Tianjin Yikun Fine Chemical Technology Development Co., Ltd. in Xinda Industrial Park, Xianshuiyu Town, Jinnan District, Tianjin, causing 10 deaths (one of them seriously injured) , 12 days later died), 3 people were seriously injured. The company is a private joint-stock enterprise established in June 2000 with a total investment of 9.7 million yuan. It started trial production in July 2003 and mainly produces xylene musk, sunflower musk and ketone musk.

　　The direct cause of the accident: The speed of the No. 5 nitration reactor was improperly controlled during the process of adding concentrated sulfuric acid, and the local chemical reaction heat in the kettle rapidly accumulated, which was not cooled in time and caused an explosion.

　　The impact of the No. 5 reactor explosion and the explosive debris caused the No. 4, No. 6 and No. 3 reactors to explode one after another, causing casualties.

　　The main cause of the accident:

　　First, the labor organization is unreasonable

　　Enterprises have serious defects in fixed posts, quotas, and responsibilities. According to the relevant operational regulations, there should be 3 full-time operators in the feeding control position of the nitrification workshop, but the company has arranged 2 people, one of whom is the squad leader and is responsible for other work such as acid exchange.

　　A total of 7 reactors were used before the accident, and only one person was operating, which could not meet the need to strictly control the reaction temperature in this position.

　　Second, hidden dangers rectification does not pay attention

　　Enterprises do not pay much attention to hidden dangers, and rectification is weak. Before the accident, there were many times when the reaction overheating caused emergency discharge, and the system for supplying chilled water to the nitrification reactor also had problems such as insufficient capacity. For these hidden dangers, corporate legal persons and principal safety production leaders have learned about it, but they have not paid attention to it and have not taken effective measures to rectify it.

　　Third, staff training is not implemented

　　The company has a training internship system on its behalf. In fact, employees are not strictly trained and assessed in accordance with relevant requirements. The employees of the company who were killed in the accident were migrant workers from other places. The shortest period of employment was only 8 months. The company could not provide complete training and assessment materials for these people. During the accident investigation, it was found that the operator’s improper control of the nitrification reaction temperature may cause The danger of the explosion is not taken seriously.

　　After the Song Dynasty accident, the Tianjin Municipal Committee held an expansion meeting to deploy a 100-day crackdown on the special rectification of dangerous chemicals in the city. All the hazardous chemicals production enterprises with major hidden dangers were suspended, rectified, and rectified within a time limit. All production conditions must be closed down, and more than 200 hazardous chemical production enterprises in the urban area will be moved out within three years.

　　The accident was caused by the operator's illegal operation, but it essentially exposed the problem of corporate security and the “two main responsibilities” of government supervision.

　　Faced with the most serious major casualties in the chemical industry in Tianjin for many years, this is the first major production safety accident in the city this year. The Municipal Safety Supervision Bureau organized all personnel to go to the scene of the accident for education, to reflect, and to perform duties that are not in place. The place is summarized as the following four main issues:

　　First, the supervision work is not enough. The implementation of the work requirements at the grassroots level and the enterprise is not comprehensive and the supervision is not comprehensive. This is one of the important reasons for the failure to implement the main responsibility of the enterprise.

　　Second, the supervision of the law is not strict enough to check for dead spots and blind spots. In particular, the supervision of non-public ownership of hazardous units is not comprehensive, and the market access for high-risk enterprises is not strict.

　　Third, the special rectification is not detailed enough to focus on the supervision of the production of hazardous chemicals, neglecting the supervision of use and other links, and grasping the basic information and data of equipment, processes, products, and safe operation of enterprises using hazardous chemicals. comprehensive.

　　Fourth, the regulatory measures are not suitable for the supervision team organization construction, business construction, work style construction, equipment construction, etc., which cannot keep up with the development of the situation. It is difficult to achieve comprehensive science.